I propose a different strategy for developing the response to situationism from early Confucian thought. This response is criticized because of its association with antidemocratic social arrangements. I argue that the criticism is based on a failure to recognize the distinction between a theoretical account of virtue and human behavior, and a practical guide for cultivating virtue while also managing situations. Confucian virtue cultivation with integrated situation control can only be effectively implemented by sustaining certain social arrangements. But what matters (...) is not that these arrangements are antidemocratic. I show that the requisite social arrangement can be realized in different ways. And that what matters is that they are (a) wide, meaning they involve community-level participation; (b) grounded in a tension system based on the confidence that everyone has a natural propensity for virtue and doubt about whether anyone can easily act in accordance with this propensity; and (c) focused on correcting morally relevant cognition so that people can do the right thing. My proposal also allows for a new empirically grounded approach to developing Confucian ideas on virtue. (shrink)